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STRUCTURED ABSTRACT  
 
Purpose of review:                 
The experience of ourselves as an embodied agent with a first-person perspective is referred to as 
“bodily self”. We present a selective overview of relevant clinical and experimental studies. 
Recent findings:          
Sharing multisensory body space with others can be observed in patients with structurally altered 
bodies (amputations, congenital absence of limbs), with altered functionality after hemiplegia, 
such as denial of limb ownership (somatoparaphrenia) and with alterations in bodily self-
consciousness on the level of the entire body (e.g. in autoscopic phenomena). In healthy 
participants the mechanisms underpinning body ownership and observer perspective are 
empirically investigated by multisensory stimulation paradigms to alter the bodily self. The 
resulting illusions have promoted the understanding of complex disturbances of the bodily self, 
such as out-of-body experiences. We discuss the role of interoception in differentiating between 
self and others and review current advances in the study of body integrity identity disorder, a 
condition shaped as much by neurological as by social-psychological factors. 
Summary:                   
We advocate a social neuroscience approach to the bodily self that takes into account the 
interactions between body, mind and society and might help close the divide between neurology 
and psychiatry. 
 
Keywords    
Illusion paradigms; interoception; body integrity identity disorder (BIID); social neuroscience
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INTRODUCTION 
Human beings are self-conscious individuals whose thinking and behavior is grounded in basic 
bodily processes. These processes transcend the sole domains of somatosensation and motor 
action; our body can be seen, its parts can be localized in space in pitch darkness, we know 
where we are heading to, and can follow our heart. Body space is a multisensory space, 
continuously made up by exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive impressions. The 
bodily self is made up of the multiple interactions between these impressions. Accordingly, the 
range of disorders affecting a person's bodily self is considerable; the body can be experienced as 
lost, not belonging, not under control, empty, ugly, detached or duplicated.  
 
Human beings represent a social species. However private and intimate a person's body may 
appear, bodily selves leap out to embrace the space they share with others - “body image is a 
social phenomenon” [1, p.217]. Social neuroscience strives at understanding the interplay 
between neural, psychological, social and cultural processes. While the brain-computer metaphor 
may serve to illustrate those disorders of the “body-in-the-brain” [2] that have classically been 
treated in neurological textbooks, a social neuroscience of corporeal awareness needs to adapt its 
metaphors to the “body-in-the-brain-in-society”. Brains thus rather resemble cell phones [3], 
whose broadband connectivity enables a person to swiftly navigate social space and to get in 
touch with conspecifics’ embodied selves.   
 
Against this background, our opinion review is presented in three parts. We first discuss recent 
advances on some classic disorders of the bodily self emphasizing empirical studies which help 
transcend the view of the bodily self as an exclusively private issue. We will then comment on 
what we think is probably the most significant trend in the research literature, i.e. the increasing 
attention given to interoceptive awareness. It may read paradoxical, but the sense of the interior 
condition of our body may open up a window to the understanding of others. Finally, we 
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consider one unusual condition, body integrity identity disorder, which seems to ideally 
exemplify how neurological factors and higher-level social norms can both significantly 
contribute to the experience of body and self as a unity. 
 
NEUROLOGY OF THE BODILY SELF – FROM SINGLE LIMBS TO WHOLE BODIES 
Phantom phenomena illustrate that the bodily self does not necessarily match the physical body. 
They are observed after the loss of limbs, but also in hemiplegia, i.e. after deafferentation of a 
hemibody or, in autoscopic reduplication, of one’s entire body [4,5] 
 
The phantom limb  
Phantom limb phenomena have always fascinated neurologists, philosophers and layman alike. 
Invisible, yet frequently pictured [6] they nicely illustrate that the borders of the bodily self do 
not need to correspond to the borders set by bone and flesh. Research on phantom sensations has 
focused on phantom pain [7 for a review], whose underlying mechanisms are currently 
controversially discussed; the classical view of painful phantom sensations as the consequence of 
maladaptive reorganization [8] was challenged by data suggesting that pain is rather associated 
with preserved function and structure in the deprived cortical area, but reduced functional 
connectivity in primary somatosensory cortex [9]. Non-painful phantom sensations do not seem 
to be related to the same reorganizational processes and appear to rely more on posterior parietal 
areas. A transcranial direct current stimulation study showed alleviation of painful phantom 
sensations after stimulation over sensorimotor areas and suppression of non-painful phantom 
sensations with posterior parietal stimulation [10]. While these observations are important, they 
do not address the merging of the bodily self with others, a process presumably mediated by the 
mirror system [11]. Extensive experimentation with a person born without arms (but no phantom 
sensations) revealed that the visual identification of manipulable artifacts allows action 
comprehension in the absence of motor representations [12,13]. Such observations are important 
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because they constrain theories of phantom sensations in limb aplasia [14]. Not commenting on 
presence or absence of phantom sensations is therefore inexcusable in any report on persons with 
congenitally absent limbs, as elucidating the employed paradigms may be [15,16]. 
Complementary to the above findings, normally limbed individuals can “merge” with the body 
representation of a visually observed armless person, and they do so as a function of their 
cognitive-emotional empathy [17]. Also after traumatic amputation, empathy seems to facilitate 
the referral of touch observed on others’ bodies onto the phantom limb [18]. Finally, work in 
healthy participants documented the influence of empathy as well as social perception on the 
bodily self and shared body representations [19-20, 21 for a review]. 
 
Somatoparaphrenia 
Patients with anosognosia for their hemiplegia sometimes deny ownership of the paralyzed part 
of their body, claiming that it belongs to somebody else, often a close relative or a person of the 
care team. Once poignantly labeled “personification anosognosia” [22] somatoparaphrenia 
represent the “filling in” of a deafferented body part by the phantom presence of somebody else.  
Recent work in the field has shown that anosognosia and somatoparaphrenia are dissociable [23], 
and the loss of ownership, but not the loss of insight into paralysis, is accompanied by a reduced 
autonomous response to incoming threat [24]. Having patients with somatoparaphrenia adopt a 
third-person perspective can drastically change bodily self-consciousness. For instance, viewing 
one’s own hand in a mirror (as if one observed it from the perspective of another person) 
abolished somatoparaphrenia in one patient [25], while intermanual coupling emerged in a 
bimanual circle-and-line drawing task [26] as long as patients incorporated another person’s 
moving hand. Together, these clinical and experimental findings suggest that the borders of 
private space critically depend on whether one takes an egocentric perspective or a perspective 
centered on a location in the space shared with others.  
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Autoscopic phenomena  
The issue of perspective is key when it comes to autoscopic phenomena, which can be conceived 
as phantoms of the entire body. Their taxonomy had originally been based on clinical 
phenomenology [27] and has now received support by quantitative lesion analysis [28]. An 
autoscopic hallucination is the visual experience of seeing oneself as in a mirror. The perspective 
is clearly embodied, the hallucination normally unimodal and, if confined to one visual field, 
almost always to the left. Accordingly, the major lesion site was found to involve right 
extrastriate cortex. In contrast, the neuroanatomical substrate of heautoscopy is quite different. 
Heautoscopy is the highly emotional encounter with a “phantom double” [29] of oneself, who 
moves independently and makes a patient wonder whether the observer perspective is centered 
on the body or the phantom. Lesion overlap analysis highlighted the left posterior insula, whose 
damage would produce a disintegration between emotional and interoceptive signals, and the 
resulting strong psychological affinity with the double would make self-localization 
undetermined. Such projective duplication is in fact at the heart of literary descriptions of 
heautoscopy (thoroughly and thrillingly reviewed in [30]), as the relative autonomy of the double 
and the ambiguity of self-localization provide the seeds for the sometimes dramatic and often 
profoundly symbolic content of doppelgänger episodes. The work by Heydrich and Blanke [28] 
is important in its attempt to link phenomenology and functional anatomy. Some questions 
remain open, however. It seems, for instance, that the opposite hemispheric involvement in 
autoscopic hallucinations and heautoscopy reside unexplained as long as symptom-lesion 
mappings will not consider the phenomenology of individual heautoscopic episodes in more 
detail. We know from non-bodily visual hallucinations that their emotional valence can be 
strongly associated with the visual half-field in which the action unfolds [31]. It is conceivable 
that lesion laterality determines to a large part whether doubles take a predominantly consoling 
or a more antagonistic role.  
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Simulated out-of-body illusion in healthy persons   
Among the autoscopic phenomena not subject to lesion analysis by the authors [28] is the out-of-
body experience (OBE, but see [32]). This is the illusion of seeing one’s own body from the 
outside. Ever since the first description of a method that induces an OBE-like apparent 
separation between body and self in healthy research participants (the "full-body illusion"; see 
Tab. 1), modifications of the technique have mushroomed. Apart from the different variations in 
procedure, interesting physiological correlates of experimentally induced changes in the bodily 
self have been described. These range from a change in skin temperature (a measure long been 
known to reflect changes in bodily awareness [64], and now increasingly used to measure body 
ownership [65-66]), and electrodermal activity [67] to immunological alterations [68]. Such 
implicit measures may prove helpful in future clinical studies of a dissociation between body and 
self.  
As mentioned in a recent review [69] some of these illusions have direct relevance for 
mentalizing and the construction of a shared space for social interactions. Putting oneself into the 
shoes of others requires to mentally locate oneself out of one's body and take the other's 
perspective.  In fact, the implications of perspective taking may even be much broader than 
commonly assumed. It has long been known that the point of view of personal memories 
depends on affective valence: we tend to remember a refreshing running exercise from a “within-
body” perspective, while running away from a threat is rather remembered from a detached, 
“out-of-body” perspective [70]. Bergouignan and coauthors [53] measured the quality of 
participants’ memory for details of a conversation held once while their bodily self was felt in a 
regular within-body location and once while they faced the conversational partner after induction 
of an out-of-body illusion [47]. Intriguingly, participants’ episodic retrieval was worse for the 
out-of-body perspective, which was accompanied by a reduced activation of the left 
hippocampus. This elegant study shows that paradigms originally created for the study of the 
bodily self can be exploited for investigations of a wider area of cognitive functions (see Tab. 1 
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for other, similarly broad explorations). On a conceptual level, it illustrates that memory retrieval 
has a strong embodied component (whose structural hub may be the right precuneus: [71]). 
Clinically, the findings may turn out to be relevant for developing treatment methods for 
memory problems in dissociative disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder and related mnestic 
syndroms in connection with emotionally disturbing autobiographic experiences.  
 
…………..…………………………… 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
…………..…………………………… 
 
BODY PERCEPTION FROM THE INSIDE OUT 
There is an increasing attention to the interoceptive sense in the current literature. We think this 
is more than a transient fad, but a trend that will significantly contribute to our understanding of 
the nature of the self, especially in its interactions with the social environment. Interoception 
means more than the continuous monitoring of one's physiological condition. It is at the heart of 
a person's emotional life and her hedonic capacities. Influential theories of emotion have relied 
on the interoceptive sense, but the recent upsurge is more broadly motivated. It embraces 
neurological, psychological and social aspects of the bodily self. On the level of functional 
neuroanatomy, many contributions elucidate the role of the insula for the integration of 
interoception, exteroception and emotion processing [72], specifically with respect to the binding 
of body and self [73]. Psychologically, interoceptive awareness, i.e. the sensitivity to consciously 
monitor internal body signals, is now recognized as an important personality trait, though with 
acknowledged cultural variations [74]. It predicts, for instance, the urge to imitate observed body 
movements [75] susceptibility to the loss of self-other boundaries [76] and the size of 
individuals’ autonomic response to caress-like hand movements in peripersonal space [77].These 
latter studies document the relevance of interoception for social neuroscience. Paradoxically, the 
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very sense devoted to the control of an individual’s inner milieu may turn out to be a window to 
other selves; a possible mediator are empathic, “shared” emotions, arguably an ontogenetically 
very early form of social awareness [78]. What remains to be established are the links between 
interoception and the frontoparietal system of multisensory peripersonal space [79] on the one 
hand and the right parietal lobe representation of social distance [80] on the other hand. A further 
line of research to be developed is an integrative approach that unifies interoceptive and other 
"private" senses like proprioception and the vestibular sense. Anatomically, convergence zones 
of interoceptive and vestibular signals have been described at the brainstem level, but to our 
knowledge, there is no behavioral exploration yet of the interactions between interoceptive and 
vestibular processing. Despite the early recognition that the sense of space and balance is barely 
separable from the sense of having a body [81], the importance of the vestibular system for the 
bodily self has only recently been re-discovered  (reviews in [82–84]).  The vestibular system 
plays a key role in coding egocentric reference frames, modulating perspective taking [85] and 
promoting self-other distinction [82]. These characteristics make the vestibular system contribute 
in important ways to higher social cognition both in health and disease [84,86,87 for reviews].  
 
THE BODILY SELF IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
The clinical pictures of many neuropsychiatric disorders, though painted on a neurological 
canvas, are colored with a paintbrush constrained by social norms. People suffering from 
anorexia may show reduced connectivity in extrastiate cortex [88] and, on the behavioral level, 
may erroneously conceive themselves too big to pass a regular doorway ([89]). But individual 
manifestations of their eating disorder strongly depend on normative standards regarding the 
appearance of a healthy body and on the severity of individual dysfunctions in the processing of 
social stimuli [90]. Likewise, persons with body dysmorphic disorder may show abnormal neural 
network organization [91], but their suffering emerges, by definition, from a comparison of their 
own bodily appearance with that of conspecifics. A recent review of several phenomenologically 
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distinct biopsychosocially grounded disturbances of the bodily self proposed that one common 
denominator could be a vulnerability of right prefrontal cortex [92]. Depending on 
environmental and social factors, this vulnerability would lead to a preoccupation with one 
particular aspect pertaining to body and self. Although hard to be tested empirically, such a view 
avoids the pitfalls of missing the big picture by unilaterally concentrating on either brain or 
society. We have recently delineated the foundations of a social neuroscience of one particular 
disorder of the bodily self that tries to unify brain, mind and society [93]. A description of the 
condition is provided below. 
 
Body integrity identity disorder (BIID) 
BIID was defined as “an unusual dysfunction in the development of one’s fundamental sense of 
anatomical (body) identity” ([94, p. 919]. Affected people typically report a feeling of 
“overcompleteness” and desire amputation of one or more limbs. Evidence is accumulating that 
this desire is accompanied by structural and functional alterations in areas of the cortex known as 
core to the binding of body and self. Tab. 2 summarizes all empirical studies we are aware of 
published during the review period.  
 
…………..…………………………… 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
…………..…………………………… 
 
While their results are compatible with the idea that BIID is primarily a disease of the brain 
[100], alternative approaches deserve more attention than they currently receive among 
neurologists and in the neuroscience community. An essay drawing on the concept of Merleau-
Ponty’s “sexual schema” complains that most neurologically oriented empirical studies on BIID 
neglect the fact that for the vast majority of affected persons the concept of amputation has a 
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strong erotic connotation [101] thus presumably evocating shared body representations. In fact, 
the oversimplification of the rich symptom complex that BIID entails may help publishing a 
focal research finding, but represents a disservice to medical decision making and ultimately to 
the suffering of the persons concerned. Neurologists’ fear that, as soon as symptoms of 
paraphilia or obsession are in the foreground, psychiatrists should rather be in charge, is 
unfounded. Apotemnophila, the precursor label for BIID, is a paraphilia designating sexual 
arousal by amputations. The spatial adjacency of insula and SII for leg representation could 
account for the higher frequency (at least 4-fold) of legs compared to arms as amputation target 
in BIID [96]. As “the insula supports an integration of body and mind” [102, p. 616] such 
observations could support an integration of neurologically and psychiatrically motivated 
approaches.  
More explicitly addressing social aspects, a recent essay [103] is based on the analysis of blogs 
posted during a period of more than 15 years on an Internet interaction forum for people with 
BIID. It reports findings that are important beyond sociology and should inform any 
neuropsychiatric approach to BIID. In a nutshell, the author’s analysis [see also 104] shows: (1) 
BIID is not confined to an “overcompleteness” in body structure, but includes the desire to 
become paralyzed, blind or deaf. Such longing for a functional impairment has been described 
earlier [105] and is covered by the labels “transableism” or “transability” [103]. (2) Over the 
years, an individual’s constellation of symptoms is strongly shaped by the symptom constellation 
of others posting their blogs on the site and by the currently dominating view of BIID as 
expressed in social media. This reflects the famous “looping effect” [106] that describes an 
interaction between the ways of classifying illnesses and the symptoms serving classification. (3) 
As reflected by inconsistencies in terminology [107] BIID is thus a condition “under 
construction”, that is, it moves along a moving trajectory between human diversity (inclusion in 
DSM-5 was debated, but rejected [108]) and mental illness, much like it happened for GID 
(gender identity disorder) some decades ago [109]. Neurological studies should attempt to meet 
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these sociological concerns to fully accommodate the complexity of BIID, appreciating old 
wisdom about the bodily self as a social rather than an exclusively private phenomenon [1]. It is 
our hope that a social neuroscience view of bodily self-consciousness will not only assist in 
bridging the gaps between brain, mind and society, but also diminish the divide between 
neurology and psychiatry [110]. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The mutual interplay between clinical observation and experimental findings (derived, for 
instance, from illusion paradigms) has elucidated the multisensory nature of the bodily self. New 
developments in the field comprise the growing attention given to the interoceptive and 
vestibular senses in connection with the process of self-other distinction and the bodily self in a 
social context. This context plays a prominent role in certain neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., 
body integrity identity disorder) and makes a social neuroscience view of the bodily self 
indispensable. 
 
KEYPOINTS 
 Disorders of the bodily self span all levels of body representation, from single limbs to the entire 
body in a social context 
 Integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive information underpins the bodily self and 
self-other distinction 
 Many disorders of the bodily self are shaped by both neurological and social factors; we 
discuss Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) as a paradigmatic case 
 A social neuroscience approach is needed to fully understand the bodily self and its 
disturbances 
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Table 1: Prominent experimental paradigms to investigate the bodily self  
 
Rubber	
hand	
illusion	
(RHI)	
Synchronous	
stroking	of	the	
invisible	real	hand	
and	a	seen	fake	
hand	induces	
illusory	ownership	
for	the	latter	[33]	
Variations	of	the	illusion:		
 Illusion	based	on	visuo‐cardiac	synchrony	[34]	
 Illusion	based	on	the	mere	expectation	of	touch	RHI	[35]	
 Illusion	induced	by	self‐stroking	[36]	(modified	after	[37,38])		
 Illusion	based	on	auditory‐tactile	synchrony	(“Marble	Hand	Illusion”	[39])	
	
RHI	in	a	special	group	of	participants:	
 RHI	can	restore	tactile	awareness	after	spinal	cord	injury	[40]	
 RHI	is	enhanced	for	patients	with	somatoparaphrenia	[25,41]	
 RHI	correlates	positively	with	body	dissatisfaction	in	body	dysmorphic	
disorder	[42]	
 RHI	in	monkeys	alters	properties	of	neurons	in	S1	and	M1	[43]	
 RHI	in	children	(4	to	9	yrs.)	reveals	two	processes	to	establish	bodily	self	
[44]	
	
Illusory	body	perception	and	higher	cognition	
 RHI	with	an	outgroup	hand	can	change	implicit	biases	towards	this	group	
[45]	
	
Full	body	
illusion	
(FBI)	
Synchronous	
stroking	of	either	
the	back	[46]	or	the	
front	body		[47,48]	
and	the	
corresponding	point	
of	a	virtual	avatar	
leads	to	illusory	
ownership	for	the	
latter.		
Variations	of	the	illusion:		
 Illusion	based	on	visuo‐cardiac	synchrony	[49]	
 Illusion	induced	by	self‐stroking	(in	MRI	environment	[50])	
	
Illusory	body	perception	and	higher	cognition	
 Illusory	identification	with	a	smaller/taller	body	changes	object	size	
perception	[51,52],	with	a	child	body	also	implicit	trait	associations	[52]	
 Illusory	disembodied	perspective	alters	the	formation	of	episodic	memory	
(and	associated	physiological	activity	in	the	left	hippocampus	[53]	
	
Enfacement	
effect	
Synchronous	
stroking	of	the	own	
face	and	the	face	of	a	
person	sitting	in	
front	of	you	leads	to	
illusory	self‐
identification	with	
the	latter	(measured	
by	increased	self‐
attribution	of	
morphed	images)	
[54,55]		
Variants	of	the	illusion	
 A	related	illusion	not	involving	stroking	is	the	“strange‐face‐illusion”	in	which	
prolonged	inter‐subjective	gazing	induces	the	perception	of	strange	faces	[56]	
	
RHI	in	a	special	group	of	participants:	
 Enfacement	illusion	demonstrated	in	newborns	(looking	preference	paradigm)	
[57]	
	
Illusory	body	perception	and	higher	cognition	
 Strength	of	illusion	depends	on	sympathy	(defined	by	previous	interactions)	
[20]	
 Enfacement	illusion	facilitates	emotion	recognition	[58]	
	
Mapping	
self‐aspects	
on	body	
templates	
Elaborating	on	[59], 
participants	have	to	
map	certain	aspects	
of	the	self	(e.g.	the	
self	[60],	certain	
body	landmarks	[61]	
or	emotions	[62]	
 The	self	is	not	localized	at	one,	but	rather	at	two	places	–	one	centered	on	the	
upper	torso	and	one	on	the	upper	head	[62]	
 Even	in	healthy	participants,	the	subjective	body	metric	does	not	correspond	
to	the	metric	of	the	physical	body	[63]	
 Basic	and	complex	emotions	are	systematically	mapped	onto	specific	body	
locations	in	a	crossculturally	stable	way	[51]	
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Table 2: Empirical group studies on BIID published during the review period (2013 – 2014) 
 
Study (alphabetical order) 
and Method 
Studied Population(s)  Major Findings   Strengths and Weaknesses 
Bottini et al., 2014 [95] 
Facial emotion recognition 
and disgust ratings for 
pictures and verbally 
described disgust‐arising 
situations 
 
5 men with AD* for one 
one leg, 1 man with AD 
for both legs, 1 woman 
with AD for one arm. 
Control participants 
matched for sex,  age 
and education 
All BIID participants show normal emotional 
facial recognition and disgust ratings of 
verbally described scenes. 
5 men with unilateral AD showed lowered 
disgust ratings for images specifically depicting 
violations of the body envelope (i.e., 
amputations) 
 
Strenght: 
Multiple case study design (no 
mixing of different clinical 
manifestation of BIID) 
 
Weakness:  
Lowered disgust for amputees’ 
depictions may simply reflect 
erotic component of BIID 
 
Hilti et al., 2013 [96] 
Structural MRI and surface‐
based morphometry. 
Questionnaire on amputation 
desire, erotic connotation, 
pretending behavior. 
Psychiatric, neurological and 
comprehensive neuropsycho‐
logical examination 
 
13 men with BIID ; 8 
with AD for left leg, 2 
with AD for right leg, 
3 with AD for both 
legs. 
Control participants 
matched for sex,  age 
handedness, footed‐
ness and education 
No neurological or neuropsychological 
dysfunctions, minor psychiatric distinctive 
features disappear after removal of scale items 
reflecting body dissatisfaction. 
Right‐hemisphere cortical thickness/and or 
surface area reduced in superior and inferior 
parietal lobule, SI, SII, anterior insula ; 
increased left‐hemisphere cortical surface area 
in inferior parietal lobule and SII.   
Individual surface area of inferior parietal 
lobule correlates negatively with strength of 
amputation desire 
Strenghts: 
Relatively large sample size; 
comprehensive clinical testing, first 
study of structural brain correlates 
of BIID 
 
Weakness:  
No whole‐brain analysis; only 
parietal and insular cortex selected 
as regions of interest 
Lenggenhager et al., 2014[97] 
Assessments of feeling of 
estrangement for all four 
limbs before and after caloric 
vestibular stimulation 
 
As in ref. 2, above  No changes in estrangement ratings nor in  
skin temperature after stimulation in either 
ear 
 
Strenght: 
Speculations about efficacy of 
caloric vestibular stimulation have 
been put to the test 
Weakness:  
Estrangement ratings may not 
adaequately reflect limb‐specific 
concerns in BIID 
 
Oddo et al., 2014 [98] 
Psychometric assessment of 
psychopathological and 
personality characteristics 
and of coping strategies 
 
15 men with BIID; 12 
with AD for one leg, 2 
for both legs (1 not 
specified) 
 
BIID participants show slightly elevated 
depressiveness and anxiety compared to 
population norms. 
Personality characteristics comprise high 
agreeableness and autonomy. Coping 
strategies are characterized by self‐control and 
self‐affirmation 
 
Strenght: 
Largest sample of persons withBIID 
in which personality features and 
coping strategies were assessed 
Weakness:  
Questionnaire data may have 
limited validity in a sample highly 
motivated to proof normality 
 
van Dijk et al., 2013 [99] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 men with BIID (2 with 
AD for left leg, 3 wiith 
AD for right leg) and 10 
matched controls 
Selectively for the affected limb BIID partici‐
pants show reduced  activity in left ventral 
premotor cortex to tactile stimulation and,   
irrespectively of the leg, a generally 
heightened activity to touch in a large 
somatorsensory network.  
Strenght: 
First functional MRI study in BIID, 
tested cortical response to both 
motor execution and tactile stimu‐
lation 
Weakness:  
Small sample size; no comparison of 
touch proximal vs. distal of line of AD 
       
 
* AD = amputation desire 
 
 
 
 
